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ABSTRACT
We investigate Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003) finding that firms with weak shareholder
rights exhibit significant stock market underperformance. If the relation between poor
governance and poor returns is causal, we expect that the market is negatively surprised by the
poor operating performance of weak governance firms. We find that firms with weak shareholder
rights exhibit significant operating underperformance. However, analysts’ forecast errors and
earnings announcement returns show no evidence that this underperformance surprises the
market. Our results are robust to controls for takeover activity. Overall, our results do not support
the hypothesis that weak governance causes poor stock returns.
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Whether corporate governance affects firm performance is a matter of much study and debate. In
an important and widely cited recent paper, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (GIM, 2003) find for the
period 1990 to 1999 that firms with strong shareholder rights have risk-adjusted stock returns
that are 8.5% higher per year than those of firms with weak shareholder rights. A puzzling
feature of the paper is that the authors find persistent stock market underperformance for firms
with weak shareholder rights, but they do not find significant underperformance in firm
operating performance, which they measure with accounting return on equity.1 This lack of
operating underperformance is surprising given the magnitude of the underperformance in stock
returns. It is also surprising in that although one might expect poor operating performance in
badly governed firms, in an efficient market one expects no relation between governance and
future stock returns (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)).
GIM conclude that there are two potential explanations for the association between stock
returns and governance.2 The first explanation is that poor governance causes agency costs (e.g.,
managerial shirking, overinvestment, and perquisite consumption), and that these costs were
underestimated by investors in 1990. As emphasized by GIM, the causal explanation requires
that investors do not fully anticipate the extent of the agency costs caused by weak shareholder
rights. Subsequent to the realization of the agency costs, investors lower their expectations about
poorly governed firms’ future cash flows, which results in stock price declines. If investor
misunderstanding of corporate governance causes differences in stock returns, one should find
1

They do find evidence that firms with weak governance have lower sales growth and lower profits as a percent of
sales. These measures, however, can reflect differences in firms’ life cycles, product mixes, and financing choices,
and thus are not necessarily indicative of differences in overall operating performance. For example, low profits as a
percent of sales will lead to a large return on equity for a firm that has high sales relative to invested capital, and
sales growth is only valuable when it is profitable (see Palepu, Healy, and Bernard (2000) pages 9-4 to 9-5 and
pages 12-6 to 12-7).
2
GIM use the general term “governance” when they refer to shareholder rights, even though shareholder rights are
only a subset of corporate governance mechanisms. Our paper examines the relation between shareholder rights and
stock returns in order to provide a general framework for investigating the relation between governance and stock
returns. When we describe this more general relation, we follow GIM and use the term governance.
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that the market is surprised by one or both of the following sources of cash flows to investors: (1)
higher (lower) than expected operating performance by the good (bad) governance firms, and/or
(2) higher (lower) than expected takeover probability of the good (bad) governance firms. The
alternative to the causal explanation is that governance is associated with risk or other factors
that happened to drive stock returns during the 1990s. In this case, governance does not cause
stock returns and there need not be any relation between shareholder rights and future cash
flows.3 Our objective is to distinguish between these two competing explanations.
As a preliminary step, we test for an association between governance and operating
performance by examining operating return on assets, a more powerful measure of operating
performance suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996). We follow GIM and measure governance
using their index of shareholder rights, the “G-index”). The G-index sums restrictions on
shareholder rights. A higher G-index is assumed to mean weaker shareholder rights and lower
governance quality. We find that the G-index has a significant negative association with future
operating performance. This result complements evidence in GIM and Fahlenbrach (2003) that
firms with higher G-indices have greater agency costs.
To determine whether the stock market underperformance of high G-index firms is
caused by investor surprise about the poor operating performance of weak governance firms, we
examine whether investors were surprised by this difference in operating performance. We
conduct two complementary tests: (1) an analysis of the relation between analyst forecast errors
and governance, and (2) an analysis of the relation between earnings announcement returns and
governance. Both tests are based on the idea that if investors do not understand the implications
of governance for future operating cash flows, they will be surprised when the realized earnings

3

GIM also propose a third explanation: Governance provisions do not cause agency costs, but are put in place by
managers who forecast low performance. They reject this explanation for lack of evidence.
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of weak (strong) governance firms are low (high) relative to their earnings forecasts. The
forecast error test assumes that analysts’ forecasts proxy for investors’ forecasts, and allows for
the possibility that investors may learn about the differential operating performance at any time
between the forecast and the earnings announcement. If analysts are overly optimistic about the
prospects of high G-index firms, we expect actual earnings to be low (high) relative to forecasted
earnings when corporate governance is weak (strong). Over forecast horizons varying in length
from one quarter to five years, we find that analysts anticipate the poor performance of high Gindex firms. As a potentially more direct test of whether investors are surprised by the
performance effects of governance, we examine whether stock returns around earnings
announcements for good governance firms are significantly higher than for weak governance
firms. For return windows of varying lengths around earnings announcements, we do not find
this hypothesized relation. Further, we show that the forecast error and announcement return
results hold for the abnormal stock returns recently documented by Cremers and Nair (2003) for
firms with a combination of strong shareholder rights and high institutional ownership. All of our
results are robust to alternative specifications that control for differences in mergers and
acquisitions (which, because of financial accounting rules during our sample period, could cause
stock returns without differences in operating performance) and differences in capital
expenditures (which could cause returns but affect earnings beyond observable analyst forecast
horizons).
The second explanation consistent with a causal relation between governance and returns
is that weak (strong) governance firms have greater (lower) takeover protection, and that their
stock returns could change when investors are surprised by the diminished (increased)
probability of receiving a takeover premium. If this explanation is correct, returns could be lower
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for weak governance firms even if investors are not surprised by these firms' lower operating
performance. However, inconsistent with this explanation, we observe that the takeover
frequency of weak governance firms increases over the 1990s, and that weak governance firms
are taken over at about the same rate as strong governance firms. Also, consistent with Cremers
and Nair (2003), we find that the return differences are not sensitive to excluding firms that were
taken over. Overall, we find no evidence consistent with the hypothesis that governance causes
unexpected cash flows that cause future abnormal stock returns.
Because our evidence is not consistent with a causal relation between governance and
returns, we examine the possibility that the return differences result from a time period-specific
irregularity that is correlated with governance. GIM (p. 131) also note this alternative
explanation. We examine accounting returns, forecast errors, and stock returns in the four years
(2000 to 2003) following the GIM sample period. Weak governance firms continue to have
lower operating performance during this period, but investors and analysts continue to forecast
this difference. Further, we find that the value weighted raw stock returns on the hedge portfolio,
which is long in firms with strong shareholder rights and short in firms with weak shareholder
rights, exhibit a reversal during 2000 to 2003; that is, high G-index firms outperform low Gindex firms. However, this effect is substantially dampened when controlling for the four risk
factors. Finally, we show that the differential returns in the original sample period are sensitive
to the exclusion of technology firms. These results raise the possibility that at least some of the
abnormal returns to shareholder rights are part of the larger new economy pricing puzzle of the
(late) 1990s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we describe our
hypotheses. We describe the data in Section II. In Section III, we present the results of our

4

empirical investigation of the hypothesis that governance causes stock returns, and in Section IV,
we present evidence on risk and other explanations for the return difference. We conclude in
Section V.

I. Hypothesis Development
A.

Shareholder Rights and Operating Performance
As noted by GIM, shareholder rights can have both negative and positive effects on a

firm’s operating performance, with the net effect being an empirical question. On the one hand,
weak shareholder rights can inhibit the removal of incompetent management. Moreover, reduced
capital market scrutiny might induce otherwise competent managers to engage in value reducing
activities such as shirking, perquisite consumption, and empire building. On the other hand, an
optimal contract may involve shareholders committing not to replace the manager by adopting
restrictions on their rights. Weak shareholder rights could enhance performance by shielding
managers from the consequences of lower-tail outcomes of good projects, thereby encouraging
managers to behave in a less risk-averse manner. Similarly, takeover deterrents can be optimal
because they reduce managerial “myopia,” that is, the need to signal quality by boosting shortterm performance at the expense of long-term value (Stein (1988)). Also, strong shareholder
rights might encourage managers to invest (suboptimally) in areas in which they have specific
expertise in order to make it harder to replace them. Weak shareholder rights might then give
managers enough job security so that they will not overinvest in these types of projects (Shleifer
and Vishny (1989)). GIM find mixed evidence on this question, but conclude overall that firms
with weak shareholder rights have higher agency costs and lower operating performance. We
reexamine this hypothesis, and state it in null form as follows

5

HYPOTHESIS 1: Shareholder rights are not associated with future operating performance.
B.

Tests of Investors’ Expectations about the Performance Implications of Shareholder
Rights
As discussed above, one explanation for the documented stockmarket underperformance

of firms with high G-indices is that investors were surprised by the operating performance of
weak governance firms. In this case, however, it is not sufficient to find differences in operating
performance. It is also important to find evidence that the differences in operating performance
were unexpected by investors.
We use two complementary tests of whether investors are surprised by operating
performance: Analyst forecast errors and earnings announcement returns. As discussed above, if
investors do not understand the implications of governance for operating performance, they will
be surprised by actual earnings that are low (high) relative to their forecasts of earnings when
corporate governance is weak (strong). Our two tests differ primarily with respect to assumptions
about when investors learn that actual earnings will be different from their forecasts: (1) at some
time between the analysts’ forecasts and the earnings announcements (forecast error tests); or,
(2) at the earnings announcements (earnings announcement return tests).
In our forecast error tests, we use sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy for
investors’ expectations to test whether investors fail to anticipate future differences in operating
performance between firms with strong and weak shareholder rights. We expect that investors’
expectations about future earnings that are impounded in stock prices are at least as sophisticated
as the expectations of analysts. Analysts’ forecasts have been shown to be both more accurate
than time-series models (e.g., O’Brien (1988)), and a better proxy for the market’s expectations
of earnings than time-series models (e.g., Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, and Zmijewski (1987)).

6

The prior literature uses analysts’ forecast errors as a proxy for investors’ earnings expectations
to distinguish between stock returns that are anomalous due to market mispricing (e.g., the
market has biased expectations about future earnings) and stock returns that are due to
differences in expected returns. For example, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Bradshaw,
Richardson, and Sloan (2001), and Teoh and Wong (2002) find patterns in analysts’ forecast
errors that are consistent with anomalous patterns in returns. These findings of negative
(positive) returns following optimistic (pessimistic) forecast errors suggest that the market did
not correctly understand the implications of current information for future performance, and
favor a causal explanation for the anomalies studied. In contrast, Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis
(2002) find that value firms do not have more pessimistic forecast errors than growth firms, and
interpret their results as providing no support for the hypothesis that the higher stock returns of
value firms are caused by investors underestimating the future earnings of these firms.
We note three potential concerns about forecast error tests. First, analyst forecasts can be
noisy or stale. Second, while mergers and acquisitions can influence stock returns, accounting for
these transactions can mask earnings differences. Third, long-term capital expenditures can
influence current stock returns, but can take longer than five years to appear in earnings – five
years is the longest available horizon for analysts’ forecasts. We address the first concern by
complementing the forecast error tests with earnings announcement return tests; we address the
two latter concerns below with sensitivity tests.
If future return differences are caused by unexpected operating performance, firms with
weak shareholder rights will have relatively more optimistic earnings forecasts than firms with
strong shareholder rights. In other words, we expect actual earnings to be low (high) relative to
forecasted earnings when corporate governance is weak (strong). In this case, we would

7

conclude that poor governance is the root cause of the anomalous stock returns documented by
GIM. In contrast, if analysts understand the relation between shareholder rights and operating
performance, we do not expect to see any relation between shareholder rights and forecast errors.
The effect of a firm’s governance structure in general, and shareholder rights in
particular, can show up in short-term profits, long-term profits, or both. Ex ante it is not clear at
which horizon systematic errors in expectations are most likely to occur, largely because it is not
known when the effect on performance is fully incorporated in the expectations. Rather than
arbitrarily picking a forecast horizon, we examine forecasts of annual earnings per share one
quarter ahead, one year ahead, and two years ahead, as well as forecasts of long-term growth in
earnings per share. The hypothesis, stated in null form, is
HYPOTHESIS 2: Shareholder rights are not associated with analyst forecast errors.
Our alternative method of examining whether the market is surprised by unexpected
operating performance is to examine returns around earnings announcements (e.g., Bernard and
Thomas (1990), Bernard, Thomas, and Wahlen (1997), La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1997)). An advantage of this method is that it does not rely on analysts’ expectations of
earnings, which can be noisy and untimely. Instead, we use the market’s expectation directly as it
is incorporated in the stock price before the announcement. However, a potential shortcoming of
this method is that investor surprise about the effect of shareholder rights on operating
performance does not necessarily occur in the short period of time around the earnings
announcement. To the extent that investors learn about the importance of governance between
earnings announcements, the earnings announcement period reflects only part of investor
surprise.

8

As above, if future return differences are caused by unexpected operating performance,
investors’ forecasts of earnings will be high (low) relative to actual earnings when corporate
governance is weak (strong). When the market is negatively (positively) surprised at the earnings
announcement, returns will be negative (positive) for the weak (strong) governance firms. In this
case, we would conclude that poor governance is the root cause of the anomalous stock returns
documented by GIM. In contrast, if the market understands the relation between shareholder
rights and operating performance, we do not expect to see any relation between shareholder
rights and announcement returns. Our hypothesis, stated in null form, is
HYPOTHESIS 3: Shareholder rights are not associated with excess returns around earnings
announcements.
C.

Shareholder Rights and Takeover Probability
Firms with weak (strong) shareholder rights have more (fewer) takeover defenses in

place, and this may result in lower (higher) takeover probability. Therefore, an alternative
explanation for the observed poor stock returns for weak governance firms is that investors were
not surprised by poor operating performance, but were instead surprised by a realized lower
probability of receiving a takeover premium. GIM (p. 143) note this possibility:
One could argue that investors had rational expectations about the costs and benefits of
takeover defenses, where the expected costs are more severe agency problems and the
expected benefits are higher takeover premiums. Then, when the hostile takeover market
largely evaporated in the early 1990s – perhaps because of macroeconomic conditions
unrelated to takeover defenses – Dictatorship firms were left with all of the costs and
none of the benefits of their defenses.
GIM provide the following argument that changes in the assessed takeover probability cannot
explain all of the return difference: Suppose that takeover premiums are 30%, and in 1990
investors assessed a 30% probability that Dictatorships would be taken over. If investors reassessed a zero takeover probability for Dictatorships, their returns would fall by 9%, or roughly

9

one year of the 9.2% ten-year average return difference. Thus, even if assessed changes in
takeover probability were very large for the firms with weak shareholder rights, it seems that this
probability reassessment would only partially explain the return difference. For purposes of
testing this conjecture, we cannot observe the expected takeover probabilities in 1990. We
instead examine whether observed takeover probabilities between the firms are different during
the 1990s, that is, we test the null hypothesis
HYPOTHESIS 4: Shareholder rights are not associated with takeover probability.

II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The initial sample consists of all firms that have a G-index, and is the sample from GIM.
GIM construct the G-index based on the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
surveys of investor rights and takeover protection. A firm’s G-index is equal to the number of
provisions restricting shareholder rights that the firm has. Restrictions can arise from either state
law or charter provisions. There are 24 provisions. Some common examples include: poison
pills, classified boards, supermajority requirements, and golden parachutes. During the 1990s,
IRRC released four editions (1990, 1993, 1995, and 1998) of these surveys of shareholder rights
and takeover defenses. As described in GIM, the IRRC universe contains large companies from
the S&P 500 and from annual lists of the largest corporations by Fortune, Forbes, and
BusinessWeek. The IRRC expanded the sample in 1998 to include smaller firms and firms with
high levels of institutional ownership.
Since the IRRC surveys are not issued every year, we follow GIM and use each year of
IRRC data to classify multiple years. For example, the G-index of 1990 is used for all time
periods after publication of the 1990 edition until the G-index of the 1993 edition became
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available, and so on. This considerably enlarges the sample, since there is no need to skip years.
This does introduce noise in the measurement of the G-index, but given the relative stability of
G-index over time, GIM claim that the noise is likely to be relatively minor. For our tests of
operating performance and forecast errors, we require that the sample firms have accounting
data, stock return data, and analyst forecast data available. We match the G-index to stock return
data obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for 12,584 firm-years.
Similar to GIM, we obtain accounting data from Compustat. Missing Compustat data reduces the
sample by 1,266 observations to 10,649 firm-years. We obtain analysts’ consensus forecasts
from I/B/E/S, and missing I/B/E/S data reduces the sample by another 732 observations, to 9,917
firm-years.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table I, Panel A. First, G-index shows a considerable
amount of cross-sectional variation. The lowest score is two, denoting a firm with only two
restrictions on shareholder rights. The firm with the most restrictions has 17 such provisions. The
sample is fairly equally distributed over the G-index portfolios. The firms in the sample are quite
large with mean (median) total assets of about $9 billion ($1.75 billion). The sample firms are
generally more profitable than other firms in their industry, as shown by their positive mean and
median industry-adjusted operating performance. We use operating return on assets (ROA) as
our measure of operating performance (described in greater detail in Section III.A). Following
GIM, we industry-adjust ROA by subtracting the ROA of the median firm in the corresponding
Fama-French (1997) industry. The median is computed using the full sample of firms that have
both CRSP and Compustat data.4 Descriptive statistics on analysts’ forecasts indicate that the
firms underperform the analysts’ average annual, two-year, and long-term forecasts. However,

4

Results are very similar if we instead compute the median using only the subset of firms that have sufficient data
on Compustat and I/B/E/S to compute all the variables that are required of the sample firms.
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there is little median bias in these forecasts. Our finding of an optimistic bias in the mean
forecast, but not in the median, is consistent with the findings of the prior literature (for a
summary, see Basu and Markov (2004)).
[Insert Table I here]
Panel B of Table I provides Pearson correlations between the G-index and firm
characteristics. Following GIM, we separately analyze the extreme portfolios in our tests. Using
GIM’s terminology, we refer to the portfolio with the strongest shareholder rights (G ≤ 5) as the
“Democracy” portfolio, and refer to the portfolio with the weakest shareholder rights (G ≥ 14) as
the “Dictatorship” portfolio. Panel B also contains the mean and standard deviation of each
variable for both the Democracy firms and the Dictatorship firms, and the mean difference
between the two groups. To ensure that our inference is unaffected by cross-sectional
dependence and serial correlation, we follow Fama and MacBeth (1973) and GIM and estimate
the correlations and mean differences by year. We report t-statistics based on the standard errors
of these annual parameter estimates, after adjusting for serial correlation using the Newey-West
(1987) procedure with one lag.5 From the table it can be seen that the firms with strong
shareholder rights tend to be smaller, more highly valued, and more profitable than firms with
weak shareholder rights. Firms with strong shareholder rights have on average fewer analysts,
and these analysts issue more optimistic and more dispersed forecasts.
In Table II, we replicate the GIM return results and show that the return results hold for
our subsample of the GIM data. In the first panel, we show the results from GIM’s Table VI,
where a value-weighted portfolio that takes a long position in the Democracy firms and a short
5

Because we only have nine time-series observations to estimate the autocorrelation, we limit the number of lags to
one, both here in Table I, and later in Tables III, IV, and V, where we also use the Newey-West procedure. If we
increase the number of lags up to six lags, the standard errors generally become slightly smaller. This occurs
because the higher-order correlations are typically negative. The inferences in these four tables, however, are
unaffected.
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position in the Dictatorship firms earns an excess return of 71 basis points per month from 1990
to 1999. The second panel shows that we replicate these results quite closely in our sample
before any data restrictions beyond those in GIM. In the third panel, we restrict the sample to
firm-years for which Compustat and I/B/E/S data are available, and include each firm’s return
starting the first month of its fiscal year and ending six months after its fiscal year-end. While the
returns for this subsample are slightly smaller than the original results, they are significant and
statistically indistinguishable from GIM’s results.6
[Insert Table II here]
III. Empirical Results: Do Shareholder Rights Cause Returns?
A.

Operating Performance
To assess the effect of shareholder rights on firm performance, we regress measures of

future operating performance (measured at time t) on G-index and control variables (measured at
time t-1). The model we use for the tests is
Industry-adjusted ROAit = α + β1G-indexi, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1 .

(1a)

We interpret a significantly positive or negative estimate of β1 as evidence of an association
between the strength of shareholder rights and operating performance. To establish a stronger
causal link, we would ideally conduct tests of the relation between changes in the G-index and
subsequent changes in operating performance. However, as noted in GIM, the G-index does not
change often, and as such we follow GIM and use a levels approach.

6

The prior literature shows that it is difficult to obtain precise estimates of expected returns (e.g., Fama and French
(1997)), and that recently developed accounting-based cost of capital measures are potentially less noisy than
measures based on a multifactor approach (Guay, Kothari, and Shu (2003)). As a robustness check, we compute
expected returns using the accounting-based cost of capital measures developed by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan
(2001) and Claus and Thomas (2001). Although we find that firms with weak shareholder rights have slightly lower
accounting-based cost of capital than firms with strong shareholder rights (untabulated), the effect is too small (less
than 1% per year) to explain the return differential between Dictatorship and Democracy firms found in GIM.
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Our measure of operating performance is operating return on assets. Operating return is a
preferred measure of operating performance because it is not affected by leverage, extraordinary
items, and other discretionary items (see Barber and Lyon (1996), pp. 361-364 for discussion).
Return on assets also has more desirable distributional properties than the return on equity
measure used by GIM (e.g., total assets are strictly positive, but equity can be zero or negative).
We measure ROA as operating income divided by year-end total assets. We use two measures of
operating income, namely, operating income before depreciation (Compustat data item 13) and
operating income after depreciation (Compustat data item 178). Both operating income measures
start with sales and subtract both costs of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative
expenses. Barber and Lyon (1996) advocate operating income before depreciation because this
measure is not affected by managerial discretion in depreciation policy. However, to the extent
that governance affects firm performance through capital expenditure programs, depreciation
expense is an important component of a firm’s performance. GIM document larger capital
expenditures by weak governance firms, and suggest that this difference may be overinvestment
that leads to poor performance. Therefore, although we use both measures, we prefer the use of
operating income after depreciation.7
We follow GIM and include book-to-market equity and firm size, measured as the
logarithm of the market value of equity, as control variables. These variables are correlated with
profitability, see, for example, Fama and French (1995), and are also correlated with shareholder
rights. We recognize that these variables are not pre-determined with respect to G-index, that is,
typically the components of G-index are known to the market at the time that our control
variables are measured (t-1 in our tests). Given that these control variables are correlated with

7

A second drawback of operating income before depreciation is that it is not available for some firms, mainly in the
financial services industry.
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expected performance, if the market takes G-index into account in pricing the stock, then the
control variables could subsume the effect of G-index. We therefore also show the results
without these control variables. Following GIM, we perform tests using median regressions to
reduce the influence of extreme observations.8 Accordingly, although we have some outliers in
our sample (see Table I), they do not affect the results. To ensure that our inference is unaffected
by cross-sectional dependence and serial correlation, we follow Fama and MacBeth (1973) and
GIM and estimate the regressions by year. We report t-statistics based on the standard errors of
these annual coefficients, after adjusting for serial correlation using the Newey-West (1987)
procedure with one lag.
We also examine operating performance differences between Democracies and
Dictatorships, because these two groups are the source of the return differences documented by
GIM. In these regressions, the sample is restricted to these two most extreme portfolios. The
model is
Industry-adjusted ROAit = α + β1Dicti, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1,

(1b)

where Dict is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the firm is a Dictatorship, and
zero if the firm is a Democracy. If the coefficient β1 on Dict is significantly negative (positive),
we interpret this as evidence that weaker shareholder rights are associated with lower (higher)
operating performance.9
The regression results are displayed in Table III. Panel A shows the results for the full
sample, and Panel B shows the results for the restricted sample that compares Dictatorship firms
with Democracy firms. Subpanels A1 and B1 show results using operating income after
depreciation, and Subpanels A2 and B2 show results using operating income before depreciation.
8

Our results for these and other tests are qualitatively similar when using regular OLS regressions.
GIM employ a Democracy dummy, which is equal to 1 - Dict. We use Dict so that G-index and Dict are positively
correlated and are larger when shareholders rights are weaker.

9
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The first column of each subpanel shows results without controls. In Panel A, the coefficients on
G-index in the absence of controls are negative but not significant. Results without controls in
Panel B using the restricted sample are consistent with those in Panel A, but are somewhat
stronger. The coefficients on Dict are negative in both subpanels and are significant in Subpanel
B1 using operating income after depreciation. These results are broadly consistent with the
hypothesis that weak shareholder rights are associated with poor operating performance.
[Insert Table III here]
The second and third columns of each subpanel add book-to-market equity (the
specification in GIM), and book-to-market equity and market value of equity, respectively, as
control variables. Now, the results for the full sample in Subpanels A1 and A2 provide strong
support for the hypothesis that firms with weak shareholder rights have poorer operating
performance. The results with controls in the restricted sample in Panel B are consistent with the
results in Panel A, but have lower significance levels. The association between weak shareholder
rights and poor operating performance is stronger in Subpanel B1 using income after
depreciation than in Subpanel B2 using income before depreciation. However, as noted above,
we consider income after depreciation to be a superior measure of operating performance for this
application because it captures the income effects of capital expenditures. To summarize, in
comparison to GIM who find no significant relation between shareholder rights and operating
performance measured as ROE, we find evidence that weak shareholder rights are associated
with lower operating performance measured as ROA.10

10

We confirm in our sample GIM’s result that there is no statistically significant relation between ROE and either
G-index or Dict.
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B.

Analysts’ Forecasts
In the prior section, we provide evidence of an association between weak investor rights

and lower subsequent operating performance. Although we have not shown a causal relation, this
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that weak governance is costly to the firm because it
lowers operating performance. However, to show that operating cash flow differences caused by
governance cause, in turn, future stock return differences, one must establish that the differential
operating performance was unexpected by investors. That is, if investors expect operating
performance to be similar across firms with weak and strong shareholder rights, they will be
surprised when firms with strong shareholder rights have greater operating performance, and
stock returns will be greater for firms with strong shareholder rights. To investigate whether the
earnings realizations surprise the investors, we examine analysts’ forecast errors over onequarter, one-year, two-year, and five-year forecasting horizons.
Forecasts of net income by sell-side analysts are the most widely available measures of
expected operating performance. We use analysts’ forecasts to proxy for investors’ earnings
expectations. To examine whether analysts understand the effect of shareholder rights on firms’
earnings, we regress forecast errors on the G-index and control variables. Similar to our model
for operating performance above, we use the model
Analysts’ forecast errorit = α + β1G-indexi, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1.

(2a)

We measure the forecast error as the difference between the I/B/E/S actual annual earnings per
share and the mean I/B/E/S consensus forecast of annual earnings per share, measured eight
months before the earnings period being forecasted. Earnings per share is net income (income
after depreciation, interest, and taxes) divided by the weighted number of shares outstanding for
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the period.11 Because the vast majority of annual reports are filed within three months after the
fiscal year-end, our measurement of analysts’ forecasts four months after the previous fiscal
year-end ensures that analysts know prior year earnings when making forecasts. The timing of
this variable is also consistent with Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2002). Similarly, for two-yearahead earnings, we measure the consensus forecast one year and eight months before the
earnings period being forecasted. To control for heteroskedasticity, we deflate the forecast errors
by lagged price and total assets per share, and report results for both measures. Consistent with
our earlier tests, we include market value of equity and book-to-market equity as control
variables. Prior research finds that these variables explain variation in forecast errors (e.g.
Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004)). We obtain the same inference if we do not include
these two control variables.
We obtain analysts’ forecasts of long-term growth in earnings from I/B/E/S. In general,
these forecasts refer to a period of five years (I/B/E/S Glossary (2000)). Consistent with Dechow,
Hutton, and Sloan (2000), we use the median forecast as our measure of the consensus forecast
of long-term growth in earnings. To measure actual long-term growth in earnings, we use the
five-year realized growth in earnings per share provided by I/B/E/S. The computation of this
annualized growth rate is described in Dechow and Sloan (1997, p. 9) and in the I/B/E/S
Glossary (2000). The forecast error is the difference between actual and expected long-term
growth, and because the measure is already expressed as a percentage, we do not deflate it.

11

Recall that in the prior section, we argue that operating income (income before interest and taxes) scaled by total
assets is the preferable measure to compare operating performance across firms. One reason for using this measure
instead of net income is to remove the effect of interest expense so as to make income comparable across high and
low leverage firms. Analysts and investors, on the other hand, use earnings per share to forecast and assess the
performance of a given firm, and we use these earnings per share forecasts to assess whether the market is surprised
by performance differences. Note that the ability of investors to accurately forecast the operating performance of
two firms does not imply that large performance differences do not exist between the two firms. Conversely, two
firms can exhibit no difference in ex post operating performance, and yet can exhibit large differences in earnings
surprises, as, for example, when a historical underperformer subsequently overperforms.

18

We also estimate the regressions on the restricted sample using Democracies and
Dictatorships only; that is,
Analysts’ forecast errorit = α + β1Dicti, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1.

(2b)

The variables are as defined above. If analysts are surprised by the differential operating
performance of weak and strong governance firms, we expect to find negative coefficients on Gindex and Dict in regressions (2a) and (2b), respectively.
We report the one-year forecast error estimates of regressions (2a) and (2b) in Table IV.
The mean annual coefficients on both G-index and Dict are insignificant but positive, which is
opposite to the predicted sign. In untabulated tests, we find that the results in Table IV are very
similar over one-quarter and two-year analyst forecast horizons. These results suggest that
analysts are aware of the negative effects of weak investor rights on operating performance. This
finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that investors misunderstand the implications of
governance for performance, and that their surprise about low G-index firms’ stronger operating
performance is what causes excess relative stock returns for low G-index firms.12
[Insert Table IV here]
In Table V, we show that the one-year and two-year forecast results also hold over the
long-term growth forecast horizon (i.e., five-year forecasts). As in Table IV, the mean annual
coefficients on both G-index and Dict are insignificant but positive, and thus opposite to the
predicted sign under the causality hypothesis. A potential concern with the long-term forecast
results is that they are based on a 5,437 firm-year subsample that may not be representative of

12

A potential concern with these tests stems from I/B/E/S’ exclusion of extraordinary and special items from its
calculation of net income. If the main driver of underperformance in weak governance firms is due to earnings
write-offs, forecasted I/B/E/S earnings might not capture differences in performance. To address this concern, we
re-run the forecast error test from Table IV, but use GAAP EPS (after extraordinary items) from Compustat instead
of the I/B/E/S-reported EPS. The results of this test yield the same inference as Table IV. In addition, we note that
our announcement return tests are not affected by this concern.
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the return results for the larger sample. However, in untabulated tests, we confirm that the excess
stock returns for this sample are qualitatively the same as those shown in Table II: The excess
return to the Democracy portfolio is 74 basis points per month with a t-statistic of 2.54.13
[Insert Table V here]
It is possible that our results are influenced by Dictatorships engaging in earnings
management. Recent literature suggests that managers bias earnings or guide analysts’ forecasts
in an attempt to meet the expectations of the market (e.g., Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) and
Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004)). If firms with weak shareholder rights are more likely to
engage in this type of earnings management, then one might expect those firms to have more
positive forecast errors. However, Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) find that Gindex is not related to measures of earnings management. In addition, while this “earnings game”
might influence errors in forecasts made shortly before the earnings announcement, it is unlikely
to affect forecast errors consistently over longer horizons of one year, two years, and five years.

C.

Earnings Announcement Returns
In the prior section, we find no evidence that strong governance firms surprise analysts

by their superior operating performance. In this section, we complement these results by
examining whether the market is surprised at the earnings announcements of these firms. If the
market learns about the differential operating performance of strong (weak) governance firms
primarily at the time earnings are announced, we expect that returns around the announcement of
earnings will be significantly greater (lower) for these firms. If earnings announcements are the
sole information events when the market learns about the negative consequences of poor
13

We measure returns for each firm-year in the sample starting with the first month of the forecast period and
ending six months after the end of the fifth fiscal year-end (a 66-month period). This cuts the number of firm-month
observations in the returns sample by about one-third.
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governance, all of the annualized raw (abnormal) return difference of 9.2% (8.3%) will occur at
earnings announcements. In this case, the raw (abnormal) announcement return difference will
be 2.3% (2.1%) for each quarterly earnings announcement. If instead, earnings announcements
are one of several information events whereby the market learns about the importance of
governance, we expect that the announcement return difference between Democracies and
Dictatorships will be greater than the average daily return difference experienced between these
groups of firms over the sample period. For example, on an abnormal return basis, the
Democracies outperformed the Dictatorships by a little more than 3.3 basis points per day over
the sample period (830 basis points per year divided by 250 trading days). Therefore, to support
the hypothesis that the market learns about the negative effects of bad governance at earnings
announcements, the three-day abnormal announcement return for Democracies over
Dictatorships should be greater than 10 basis points.
To test this hypothesis, we gather all quarterly earnings announcement days from I/B/E/S
from September 1990 to December 1999, and match them to returns in the full GIM sample.14
This results in a sample of 43,992 quarterly earnings announcements. We denote the earnings
announcement day as day 0, and we measure returns over windows of varying lengths that
include the announcement date.
We examine both raw returns and abnormal returns around earnings announcements. For
both measures, we follow La Porta et al. (1997) and use a Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach to
estimate value-weighted average announcement returns and their standard errors. The weighting
of observations implicit in this procedure closely matches the hedge portfolio approach in GIM,
whereby returns are value-weighted within months, but months are equally weighted. For all the

14

Our results are qualitatively similar if we instead examine the subsample of GIM firms for which we have
Compustat and I/B/E/S forecast data (9,917 firm-years as shown in Table I).
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earnings announcements within a given calendar quarter, we weight each return by the market
value of equity measured a month before the earnings announcement. This gives a valueweighted average return for each calendar quarter. Aggregating by quarter ensures an even
distribution of observations within periods – each firm, regardless of its choice of fiscal year-end,
announces earnings once per quarter.15 We then calculate the overall value-weighted average
announcement return as the average of these quarterly returns. We evaluate the significance of
the mean return using the time-series standard error of the quarterly returns. We use this
approach because earnings announcements tend to cluster by industry and because news about
one firm in an industry is news about others, and as a result, we expect cross-sectional
dependence even in abnormal returns.
In Panel A of Table VI, we report three-day returns from one day prior to the
announcement day to one day after the announcement day, which we refer to as the (-1,1)
window. Column 1 shows average raw returns for the G-index deciles. The announcement
returns of Democracies are 0.27% higher than those of Dictatorships, but this difference is not
significant. Annualized, this return difference is 1.08%, or less than 15% of the observed 9.2%
difference in raw returns.
[Insert Table VI here]
In Column 3, we show three-day abnormal returns. The abnormal return is computed by
subtracting from the raw return an expected return estimated using a Fama-French (1993) threefactor model for daily returns. We estimate the return model for the 250 trading days ending 21
trading days prior to the earnings announcement. We note that the intercept in the expected
15

One could argue that estimating the difference by month more closely matches the hedge portfolio approach of
GIM. However, most firms have a December fiscal year-end, whereas other months are much less frequently used.
This causes clustering in certain months. When we examine announcements by Democracies and Dictatorships, the
number of announcements per month is highly uneven, ranging from 12 to 186. The number of announcements per
quarter has much less dispersion, ranging from 160 to 268 announcements.

22

return model captures the expected underperformance (overperformance) of the Dictatorships
(Democracies) relative to the other decile portfolios. That is, the abnormal return measures are
excess returns beyond the 0.10% return difference one would expect over a three-day period
given that the Democracies are known to outperform the Dictatorships by 8.3% per year during
this sample period.
The excess announcement returns for all of the G-index portfolios are positive, and are
significant for two of the ten portfolios.16 Unlike GIM’s Table VI results on excess returns for
the entire period, we find no evidence of monotonicity in the announcement period returns across
G-index deciles. A Spearman rank-correlation test does not reject the null hypothesis of no
correlation between the G-decile rankings and the announcement return rankings.
The abnormal announcement returns of the Democracies are 0.21% higher than those of
the Dictatorships, but this difference is not significant. As in Column 1, on an annualized basis,
this return difference is less than 15% of the observed difference in abnormal returns between the
Dictatorships and Democracies. Also, the positive abnormal returns to the Dictatorships are
inconsistent with investors being surprised by poor operating performance of those firms.
Overall, the evidence in Table VI, Panel A does not support the hypothesis that the market
perceives the news about cash flows at the announcement date to be significantly better for
Democracies.
There are two potential concerns with using a short event period. First, firms with bad
news announce earnings later on average. Investors react negatively to nondisclosure around the
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These positive abnormal returns seem counterintuitive, but are consistent with the prior literature that documents
positive abnormal returns around earnings announcements (e.g., Ball and Kothari (1991), Chambers, Jennings and
Thompson (2004), Cohen, Dey, Lys, and Sunder (2003)). This prior literature argues that positive returns occur
because of nondiversifiable risk associated with earnings announcements, and investors require a premium for this
risk. Cohen et al. (2003) show that there exists a three-day average excess return of 0.15% for a large sample of
earnings announcements from 1978 to 2001.
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expected announcement date, with the reaction around the official announcement day being
muted. Second, firms with bad news might pre-announce some information before the actual
earnings announcement. If Dictatorships have worse news on average and employ these
strategies, a short-window event study will underestimate the return difference between the two
groups. To address this concern, we investigate several other windows that start cumulating
returns at an earlier date. The results, shown in Table VI, Panel B, indicate that lengthening the
windows to as much as 22 days increases the magnitude of the difference in raw returns (as one
would expect given the documented 9.2% annual return difference), but has little effect on the
excess return results. However, none of the return differences are significant for any event
window.
Overall, the earnings announcement tests confirm the conclusion of the forecast error
tests that surprises about operating performance do not explain differences in observed stock
returns between Dictatorships and Democracies.

D.

Differences in Takeover Probability
An alternative explanation for the observed poor stock returns for weak governance firms

is that investors were not surprised by poor operating performance, but were instead surprised by
a lower realized probability of weak governance firms receiving takeover premiums. We test this
argument by examining completed takeovers of Democracies and Dictatorships. We use delisting
codes from CRSP to determine which firms were taken over. In Panel A of Table VII, we show
the frequency of takeovers of Dictatorships and Democracies during four time intervals over the
sample period. Each interval starts at the publication date of the IRRC book that is the source of
the GIM classification, and ends with the publication of the next edition. For example, the first
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row shows that over the 34-month period from September 1990 to May 1993, three of 85 firms
classified at the start of the period as Dictatorships were taken over, and 13 of 158 firms
classified as Democracies were taken over.
[Insert Table VII here]
In Panel B, we convert these frequencies into annualized probabilities by dividing the
proportion of takeovers by the number of years in the period. We find that there is little
difference in the probability of takeover between the two samples. Both groups of firms exhibit a
greater takeover probability in the later part of the sample period. Although Democracies are
more likely to be taken over in the early and late 1990s, Dictatorships have a higher takeover
probability in the mid-1990s. Overall, Dictatorships have a slightly lower annualized takeover
probability of 4.1% per year, as compared to 4.5% per year for the Democracies.17 These results,
while surprising if one views the G-index as an antitakeover index, are consistent with G-index
being a broad governance index. For example, golden parachutes, which are typically assumed to
reduce managerial resistance to takeovers, are included in the G-index as a restriction on
shareholder rights.
Although the differences in takeover probability between Dictatorships and Democracies
appear to be too small to explain the large differences in realized stock returns, it is possible that
Democracies and Dictatorships differ in the circumstances of the takeover and the premium paid
(e.g., it is conceivable that Dictatorships execute “friendly” takeovers at low premiums following
poor market performance). To examine the effect of takeovers on stock returns, we recompute
17

Empirical evidence suggests that larger firms are less likely to be taken over (e.g., Comment and Schwert (1995)).
There is mixed evidence on whether there is an association between firm performance and takeover probability (e.g.,
Palepu (1986) finds a negative relation while Comment and Schwert (1995) find no relation). In untabulated tests,
we examine differential takeover probabilities for Dictatorships and Democracies after controlling for firm size, time
dummies, and recent stock returns. We find that size is negatively related to takeover probability, as expected, and
that prior stock returns (either two or three years prior to delisting) are not related to takeover probability. Moreover,
we find that the slightly higher unadjusted takeover probability for Democracies disappears after including the
control variables.
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the return differentials after excluding the returns of takeover targets in the period leading up to
the delisting. Excluding returns in the year or in the two years before takeover delisting has little
effect on the return differentials between Dictatorships and Democracies. In both cases, the
return differential between the Dictatorships and the Democracies remains significant at over 73
basis points per month. Excluding takeover firms completely from the sample also has little
effect on the results. In this case, the excess return differential between Dictatorship and
Democracy firms remains significant at over 59 basis points per month. Our results are
consistent with those of Cremers and Nair (2003), who show that their return results are robust to
excluding firms that are taken over. Thus, we conclude that differences in takeover probability
are unlikely to be a major cause of the difference in observed stock returns between
Dictatorships and Democracies.

E.

Robustness of Operating Performance Surprise Results and Further Tests
In this section, we explore the influence on our results of two potentially confounding

issues: Accounting issues related to mergers and acquisitions and investment in capital projects
with long-run earnings effects. As described below, these two issues could hamper our ability to
document earnings surprises.
E.1.

Mergers and Acquisitions

In our tests on operating performance and analysts’ forecast errors, the maintained
assumption is that if weak corporate governance leads managers to make poor decisions, the
effects should ultimately show up in lower accounting earnings. When analysts and the market
are surprised by poor earnings, forecast errors are negative and stock prices fall. A potential
concern is that if managers’ poor decisions come mainly in the form of overpaying for
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acquisitions, these overpayments could lower the stock price, but not affect accounting earnings
and forecast errors. This concern arises from the peculiarities of acquisition accounting,
particularly the “pooling” method of accounting, which can cause short-term earnings increases
or decreases regardless of whether the acquirer has overpaid for the acquisition target. This is of
particular concern because GIM find that high G-index firms are more likely to engage in
acquisitions, and the prior literature finds both negative announcement effects around
acquisitions and post-acquisition stock price underperformance.
To mitigate this concern, we examine stock returns, forecast errors, and earnings
announcement returns for periods in which the sample firms did not engage in acquisitions. We
gather acquisition announcement dates from the SDC mergers and acquisitions database. We
then re-run the stock return tests in GIM, after excluding returns for windows of varying lengths
around the acquisition announcements. When excluding the five months centered on the
announcement, the excess return differential between Dictatorship and Democracy firms remains
significant (at a 10% level) at 55 basis points per month (compared to 69 basis points for the full
sample). Using a more conservative window that excludes the fourteen-month period starting
two months before the acquisition through the eleventh month after the acquisition, we find that
the excess return differential is 59 basis points per month. These results indicate that mergers and
acquisitions do not account for the majority of the stock return differential between the
Dictatorships and Democracies.
To complete the analysis, we re-run the forecast error and announcement returns tests in
Tables IV, V, and VI, and exclude forecasts and the associated announcement returns for periods
in which acquisitions occurred. The results of these tests are very similar to those shown in the
tables. Inconsistent with the hypothesis that the performance effects of governance are
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unanticipated, the coefficients on G-index and Dict remain insignificant. Overall, this analysis
indicates that firms not engaging in acquisitions yield results similar to the full sample of firms,
and suggest that our inference is not biased by accounting for mergers and acquisitions.

E.2.

Capital Expenditures

GIM find that the median capital expenditures scaled by assets are 0.6% higher for
Dictatorships than Democracies, and interpret this as evidence consistent with the hypothesis that
weak governance causes agency problems. If Dictatorships’ capital expenditures are generally
associated with very long-term projects, it is conceivable that it would take more than five years
for the cash flow effects to show up in earnings. In this case, these excess capital expenditures
would have little effect on forecast errors over the horizons we examine, but investors might
observe the expenditures and lower the stock price.
To explore this possibility, we examine stock returns, forecast errors, and earnings
announcement returns for periods in which the sample firms did not have “unusual” capital
expenditures. We follow GIM and define industry-adjusted capital expenditures as annual capital
expenditures divided by total assets minus the industry median of this ratio. We consider a
firm’s capital expenditures to be “unusual” if this figure is in the top 10% of annual observations
over the full sample period.
We find that 11.7% of the Democracy firm-years exhibit unusual capital expenditures,
compared to only 5.2% of the Dictatorship firm-years.18 Although Dictatorships appear to make
large industry-adjusted investments with lower frequency, it is possible that when Dictatorships
18

Our results are virtually identical if we instead define “unusual” as the top 20% of this measure, or if we instead
rank on the residual from a regression of industry-adjusted capital expenditures on book-to-market equity. Note that
our finding that unusual capital expenditures are lower for Dictatorships does not contradict the GIM finding that
median capital expenditures are higher for Dictatorships: The GIM median regressions downweight the unusual
observations that are the focus of our analysis.
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(Democracies) make unusually large investments, they are low (high) quality, which could
trigger revisions in investors’ beliefs about firm value. To test this conjecture, we exclude returns
of firm-years with “unusual” capital expenditures. To do this, we exclude the firm’s eighteenmonth return starting the first month of the fiscal year in which the unusual capital expenditures
were made, and ending six months after the fiscal year-end. The return results are nearly
identical to those shown in Table II. To complete the analysis, we re-run the forecast error and
announcement returns tests in Tables IV, V, and VI, and exclude forecasts and the associated
announcement returns for periods in which unusual capital expenditures occurred. The results of
these tests are very similar to those shown in the tables. Overall, this analysis indicates that our
inference is not biased by poor capital expenditures made by Dictatorship firms.

F.

Application to Other Research on Governance and Stock Returns
The framework developed above can be used to investigate other governance-related

anomalies. For example, Cremers and Nair (2003) extend GIM by hypothesizing that a
combination of strong shareholder rights and strong external monitoring (as proxied by high
institutional or public pension fund ownership) results in more effective governance than strong
shareholder rights alone. To test this hypothesis, they form a portfolio restricted to firms in the
highest quartile of institutional (or public pension fund) ownership. Within this portfolio, they
buy firms with low G-indices and sell firms with high G-indices. They document that these
portfolios exhibit abnormal returns of 10% to 15% per year from 1990 to 2001. These abnormal
returns are greater than the abnormal returns documented by GIM, who do not sort on
institutional (or public pension fund) ownership.
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To test whether investors are surprised by the performance of high ownership / low Gindex firms, we conduct an analysis similar to that in Tables IV to VI, except that we modify it to
follow Cremers and Nair’s procedure of restricting the sample to the highest quartile of
institutional (or public pension fund) ownership. Consistent with Cremers and Nair, we obtain
the institutional ownership data from CDA Spectrum, which collects data from SEC 13f filings.
Within this restricted sample, we then test whether low G-index firms have more positive
forecast errors and more positive announcement returns. Consistent with the findings in Tables
IV to VI, we find no evidence that analysts or investors are surprised by the operating
performance of low G-index firms in the high institutional (or public pension fund) ownership
sample.19 Combined with other evidence provided in Cremers and Nair (2003), our results
suggest that the abnormal returns are due to risk or other factors that happen to be correlated with
governance.

IV. Empirical Results: Are the Findings Period-Specific?
Our analysis yields little evidence supporting the hypothesis that corporate governance
causes the differential future returns found in GIM. Although the results do suggest that weak
shareholder rights are associated with lower operating performance, we find that analysts appear
to understand the performance effects of shareholder rights when making earnings forecasts, and
that there is no difference in returns at earnings announcements. In this section, we explore the
possibility that the GIM return differentials result from a period-specific factor that happens to be
correlated with governance. This explanation is speculative.
We explore whether the GIM result is potentially time period-specific by looking at the
returns to the strategy in the four years immediately after the original sample period (2000 to
19

Results available on request.
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2003). Following GIM we focus mainly on the value weighted returns. The results are displayed
in Table VIII. Panel A shows the value of a hedge portfolio that takes a short position of $1 in
the Dictatorship portfolio and invests it in the Democracy portfolio on September 1, 1990.
During the original GIM sample period, 1990 to 1999, the hedge portfolio grows from $0 to
$3.62. However, in the subsequent four years ending December 31, 2003, there is a sharp decline
in the value of the hedge portfolio, mainly because of the poor performance of the Democracy
portfolio. The second part of Panel A shows the annualized returns in the two subperiods (1990
to 1999 and 2000 to 2003) and for the whole period (1990 to 2003). Weak shareholder rights
firms outperform strong shareholder rights firms by about 10% per year in raw returns over the
four years immediately following the original sample period (2000 to 2003). This reduces the
overperformance of the Democracy portfolio for the 1990-to-2003 period to 2.6% compared to
9.2% for the original 1990-to-1999 period.20
[Insert Table VIII here]
Figure 1 illustrates these differences. It shows the development of the value of the
Democracy, Dictatorship, and hedge portfolio from 1990 to 2003. The upper line plots the value
of the Democracy portfolio, assuming $1 is invested in the portfolio in September, 1990. The
middle line plots the value of the Dictatorship portfolio, and the bottom line plots the value of the
hedge portfolio. The graph indicates that nearly all of the positive returns to the hedge portfolio
documented by GIM for the 1990-to-1999 time period occur from 1997 to 1999. Prior to 1997,
the hedge portfolio earns nearly flat returns, and post-1999, the hedge portfolio earns negative
returns.

20

For these tests, we use the 1998 data on G-indices for the later periods instead of utilizing the new data that
became available in 2000 and 2002. Using the 1998 data fits the notion that the stock market performance of a
particular set of firm reverses. However, if we examine performance using the updated data on G-index, we find
similar results.
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[Insert Figure 1 here]
In Panel B of Table VIII, we show stock return results after controlling for the FamaFrench (1993) three factor model plus momentum (consistent with GIM, Table VI). We first
show the results from Table II of our replication of the GIM results over the 1990-to-1999
period. Next we present the analysis of the four years after the initial sample period (2000 to
2003). Controlling for the four factors reduces the reversal effect substantially, with two factors
playing an important role in explaining this effect. First, the hedge portfolio has a strong negative
loading on the HML factor, and HML performs very well during the 2000-to-2003 period. And,
second, the hedge portfolio has a positive and statistically significant loading on the market
factor during the market downturn, but hardly any loading during the rest of the period. The
combined effect is a small and statistically insignificant reversal in abnormal returns. However,
adding these four years to the original sample reduces the observed abnormal returns by over
one-third and reduces their significance for the 1990-to-2003 period. While the annualized
excess returns to the strategy are 8.3% per year from 1990 to 1999, they lose significance and
fall to 4.8% a year over the extended period from 1990 to 2003.21

22

When we examine equal

weighted returns, we find that the raw returns are very similar for the Democracy and the
Dictatorship portfolios from 2000 to 2003 The hedge portfolio continues to earn abnormal
returns (though not statistically significant) during this period, and monthly abnormal returns
over the extended period (1990 to 2003) are similar to those in the original sample period (1990
to 1999).

21

There is a suggestion of this finding in Cremers and Nair (2003): They modify the GIM sample to exclude ADRs
and extend this sample to the end of 2001, and find that excess returns fall from 8.5% to 7.5%.
22
To ensure that the return reversal is not driven by unexpected changes in operating performance, we re-run our
analyses in Tables III to VII to include the years 2000 to 2003 (not tabulated). We find that weak governance firms
continue to have lower operating performance during this latter period (2000 to 2003), that analysts continue to
forecast this difference, and that there are no differences in announcement returns.
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The results of the 2000-to-2003 period are somewhat surprising in light of claims that in
the last few years we have witnessed a “governance crisis.” If this were the case, one would
expect well-governed firms to outperform poorly governed firms as investors realize the
importance of good governance. This raises doubts about whether the observed stock returns are
caused by governance characteristics or instead by other correlated factors. Given the pattern and
timing of the stock returns, an obvious candidate to consider is the influence of the “new
economy.” In untabulated tests, we follow Anderson and Reeb (2003) and exclude firms with
two-digit SIC codes of 35 (Industrial machinery and equipment), 36 (Electronic and other
electrical equipment), 38 (Instruments and related products), and 73 (Business services). We
acknowledge that this is a rather crude approximation of new economy firms; for example,
Amazon is classified as a retail firm and hence is not excluded. Excluding these firms from the
sample drops the monthly hedge returns to 0.44% (t = 1.74) over the original sample period
(1990 to 1999), and to 0.25% (t = 1.11) over the full period (1990 to 2003). When excluding the
sample of Internet firms identified in Hand (2000), a much smaller and more focused sample, we
find very similar results, namely 0.46% (t = 1.83) and 0.25% (t = 1.14), respectively.23 Since
excluding observations without a clear theory is rather arbitrary, we view these results mainly as
exploratory in nature. The results are suggestive of the shareholder rights anomaly being
connected to (but not fully explained by) the larger new economy pricing anomaly of the (late)
1990s.24
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When we examine equal weighted returns, we find that excluding firms according to the Anderson and Reeb
definition drops the monthly hedge from 0.45% (t = 2.05) to 0.20% (t = 0.89) during the original sample period
(1990 to 1999), and from 0.43% (t = 2.34) to 0.17% (t = 0.92) over the extended period (1990 to 2003). Using the
Hand definition, the effect is only a few basis points due to the small number of firms that are excluded. Overall,
these tests are consistent with finding in GIM that industry affiliation explains part of the return difference between
Democracies and Dictators.
24
In a recent working paper, Moorman (2004) calculates expected returns using benchmark portfolios based on
matching Dictatorships and Democracies to firms that are in the same industry, and have similar momentum and
size. He finds that Dictatorships and Democracies exhibit returns similar to these benchmarks. If these benchmarks
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V. Summary and Conclusion
We extend GIM’s comparative investigation of stock returns and operating performance
for firms with strong and weak shareholder rights. The key puzzle that we explore is why public
information about governance does not appear to be impounded in stock prices in a timely
manner. Specifically, what accounts for GIM’s intriguing result that abnormal stock returns for
strong governance firms are greater than for weak governance firms? We begin our analysis by
providing evidence that firms with weak shareholder rights have lower operating performance.
Then, using analysts’ earnings forecasts and returns around earnings announcements as proxies
for investor expectations, we find that analysts and investors are not surprised by differences in
operating performance. We also show that weak governance firms are taken over at about the
same rate as strong governance firms, and that differences in takeover probability are unlikely to
explain the return difference. Finally, we provide evidence that the return differences are not due
to market reactions to acquisition and capital expenditure announcements. Our evidence is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that shareholder rights cause future abnormal stock returns.
This inference about causality, however, makes the abnormal stock returns for strong
governance firms even more puzzling. We consider the possibility that the time period in GIM’s
study is somehow unusual. We examine stock returns and operating performance for weak and
strong governance firms subsequent to GIM’s original sample period, and find that weak
governance firms continue to have lower operating performance and that analysts and investors
continue to forecast this difference. However, abnormal stock returns for firms with weak
shareholder rights are somewhat greater than returns for strong governance firms. Overall, our
are used to control for expected returns, there is no excess return difference between Dictatorships and Democracies.
His results are consistent with the shareholder rights anomaly being a manifestation of returns to industry,
momentum, and size.
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evidence points away from the hypothesis that differences in shareholder rights cause higher
returns, and suggests that time period-specific returns and/or differences in expected returns
likely play a role in explaining the documented abnormal stock returns of strong governance
firms.
Although we focus our analysis on carefully examining a single governance anomaly, we
believe that we provide a framework for investigating other governance-related anomalies. We
illustrate a use of this framework by providing supporting evidence for Cremers and Nair’s
(2003) findings that the abnormal returns are due to risk or other factors that happen to be
correlated with governance. Such a framework is important because it is important to understand
the implications of governance for performance. We understand the attractiveness of directly
examining stock returns to determine this association. However, we believe that stock returns are
difficult to interpret because bad governance can impose substantial ongoing costs on
shareholders with no return effect so long as shareholders are not surprised by the costs.
Moreover, it is well known that current models of asset pricing are imperfect, and that
researchers regularly find new examples of significant excess returns that appear anomalous (see
Schwert (2003) for a survey). We argue that the anomalous returns to governance need not be a
puzzle and can be verified and strengthened following the approach in our paper. If governance
causes long-term stock returns, governance also causes systematic differences in operating
performance, and these systematic differences cause systematic performance surprises to the
market, which should appear in unexpected earnings.

35

REFERENCES
Abarbanell, Jeffrey S., and Victor L. Bernard, 1992, Tests of analysts’ overreaction/
underreaction to earnings information as an explanation for anomalous stock price
behavior, Journal of Finance 47, 1181-1207.
Abarbanell, Jeffrey S., and Reuven Lehavy, 2003, Biased forecast or biased earnings? The role
of reported earnings in explaining apparent bias and over/underreaction in analysts’
earnings forecasts, Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 105-146.
Anderson, Ronald C., and David M. Reeb, 2003, Founding family ownership and firm
performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, Journal of Finance 58, 1301-1328.
Ball, Ray, and S.P. Kothari, 1991, Security returns and earnings announcements, Accounting
Review 66, 718-738.
Barber, Brad M., and John D. Lyon, 1996, Detecting long-run abnormal operating performance:
The empirical power and specification of test statistics, Journal of Financial Economics
41, 359-399.
Basu, Sudipta, and Stanimir Markov, 2004, Loss function assumptions in rational expectations
tests on financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, Journal of Accounting and Economics 38,
171-203.
Bernard, Victor L., and Jacob K. Thomas, 1990, Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect
the implications of current earnings for future earnings, Journal of Accounting and
Economics 13, 305-340.
Bernard, Victor L., Jacob. K. Thomas, and James M. Wahlen, 1997, Accounting-based stock
price anomalies: Separating market inefficiencies from risk, Contemporary Accounting
Research 14, 89-136.
Bowen, Robert M., Shivaram Rajgopal, and Mohan Venkatachalam, 2002, Accounting choice,
corporate governance and firm performance, Working paper, University of Washington at
Seattle.
Bradshaw, Mark T., Richardson, Scott A., and Richard G. Sloan, 2001, Do analysts and auditors
use the information in accruals?, Journal of Accounting Research 39, 45-74.
Brown, Lawrence D., Paul A. Griffin, Robert L. Hagerman, and Mark E. Zmijewski, 1987,
Security analyst superiority relative to univariate time-series models in forecasting
quarterly earnings, Journal of Accounting and Economics 9, 61-87.
Chambers, Dennis, Ross Jennings, and Robert B. Thompson II, 2004, Using earnings
announcement returns as evidence of mispricing: The importance of information flow,
Working paper, University of Kentucky.

36

Claus, James J., and Jacob K. Thomas, 2001, Equity premia as low as three percent? Evidence
from analysts’ earnings forecasts for domestic and international stock markets, Journal of
Finance 56, 1629-1666.
Cohen, Daniel A., Aiyesha Dey, Thomas Lys, and Shyam V. Sunder, 2003, Blinded by the light:
Are earnings announcements worth the risk?, Working paper, Northwestern University.
Comment, Robert, and G. William Schwert, 1995, Poison or placebo? Evidence on the
deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures, Journal of Financial
Economics 39, 3-43.
Core, John E., Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker, 1999, Corporate governance, chief
executive compensation, and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371406.
Cremers, K.J. Martijn, and Vinay B. Nair, 2003, Governance mechanisms and equity prices,
Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Dechow, Patricia M., Amy P. Hutton, and Richard G. Sloan, 2000, The relation between
analysts’ forecasts of long-term earnings growth and stock price performance following
equity offerings, Contemporary Accounting Research 17, 1-32.
Dechow, Patricia M., and Richard G. Sloan, 1997, Returns to contrarian investment strategies:
Tests of naive expectations hypotheses, Journal of Financial Economics 43, 3-27.
Doukas, John A., Chansog Kim, and Christos Pantzalis, 2002, A test of the errors-inexpectations explanation of the value/glamour stock returns performance: Evidence from
analysts’ forecasts, Journal of Finance 57, 2143-2165.
Fahlenbrach, Rudiger, 2003, Shareholder rights and CEO compensation, Working paper,
University of Pennsylvania.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1995, Size and book-to-market factors in earnings and
returns, Journal of Finance 50, 131-155.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1997, Industry costs of equity, Journal of Financial
Economics 63, 153-194.
Fama, Eugene F., and James D. MacBeth, 1973, Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests,
Journal of Political Economy 81, 607-636.
Gebhardt, William R., Charles M.C. Lee, and Bhaskaran Swaminathan, 2001, Toward an implied
cost of capital, Journal of Accounting Research 39, 135-177.

37

Gompers, Paul A., Joy L. Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity
prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107-155.
Guay, Wayne R, S.P. Kothari, and Susan Shu, 2003, Properties of implied cost of capital using
analysts’ forecasts, Working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Hand, John R.M, 2000, Profits, losses and the non-linear pricing of internet stocks, Working
paper, University of North Carolina.
I/B/E/S International Inc., 2000, The I/B/E/S glossary. A guide to understanding the I/B/E/S
terms and conventions.
La Porta, Rafael, Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, Good news
for value stocks: Further evidence on market efficiency, Journal of Finance 52, 859-874.
Moorman, Ted, 2004, Governance and stock returns, Working paper, Texas A&M University.
Newey, Whitney K., and Kenneth D. West, 1987, A simple positive-definite, heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix, Econometrica 55, 703-708.
O’Brien, Patricia C., 1988, Analysts’ forecasts as earnings expectations, Journal of Accounting
and Economics 10, 53-83.
Palepu, Krishna G., 1986, Predicting takeover targets: A methodological and empirical analysis,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 8, 3-35.
Palepu, Krishna G., Paul M. Healy, and Victor L. Bernard, 2000, Business Analysis and
Valuation: Using Financial Statements, (South Western College Publications).
Richardson, Scott A., Siew Hong Teoh, and Peter D. Wysocki, 2004, The walkdown to beatable
analyst forecasts: The role of equity issuance and insider trading incentives,
Contemporary Accounting Research 21, 885-924.
Schwert, G. William, 2003, Anomalies and market efficiency, in George Constantinides, Milton
Harris, and René Stulz eds.: Handbook of the Economics of Finance (North-Holland).
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1989, Management entrenchment: The case of
manager-specific investments, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 123-139.
Stein, Jeremy C., 1988, Takeover threats and managerial myopia, Journal of Political Economy
96, 61-80.
Teoh, Siew Hong, and T.J. Wong, 2002, Why new issues and high-accrual firms underperform:
The role of analysts’ credulity, The Review of Financial Studies 15, 869-900.

38

Table I: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A:
Variable
G-index
Total assets (in millions of $)
Market value of equity (in millions of $)
Log(market value of equityt-1)
Log(book-to-market equityt-1)
Industry-adjusted ROA (after depreciation.)
Industry-adjusted ROA (before depreciation)
Forecast error (one year)/price
Forecast error (one year)/total assets per share
Number of forecasts in consensus
Log (dispersion in analysts' forecasts)
Median long-term growth forecast
Actual annualized five-year EPS growth rate
Forecast error in long-term growth forecast

Mean
9.30
8,932
5,199
7.12
-0.66
0.04
0.05
-0.02
-0.01
12.72
-2.92
12.21
11.89
-0.31

Std Dev
2.82
29,952
16,738
1.51
0.70
0.10
0.10
0.23
0.06
8.83
1.18
5.68
36.93
37.02

Minimum
2
14
5
1.34
-6.49
-1.43
-0.73
-13.81
-3.00
1.00
-5.94
0.00
-83.78
-108.78
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Q1
7
582
478
6.06
-1.07
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
6.00
-3.73
9.00
-0.21
-12.27

Median
9
1,756
1,271
7.03
-0.58
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.00
11.00
-3.12
12.00
9.06
-1.47

Q3
11
5,894
3,705
8.08
-0.19
0.07
0.08
0.00
0.00
18.00
-2.30
15.00
18.21
6.02

Maximum
17
716,937
508,329
12.72
2.86
0.81
0.81
1.43
1.70
50.00
3.58
52.50
1297.20
1288.20

N
9917
9917
9905
9917
9917
9917
9704
9917
9917
9917
9220
5437
5437
5437

Panel B:
Log(market value of equityt-1)
Log(book-to-market equityt-1)
Industry-adjusted ROA (after depr.)
Industry-adjusted ROA (before depr.)
Forecast error (one year)/price
Forecast error (one year)/assets per share
Number of forecasts in consensus
Log (dispersion in analysts' forecasts)
Median long-term growth forecast
Actual five-year EPS growth rate
Forecast error in long-term growth forecast

Correlation with G-index

Democracy firms

correlation

t-statistic

Mean

Std Error

Mean

Std Error

Mean

t-statistic

0.08
0.01
-0.03
-0.03
0.04
0.05
0.10
-0.05
-0.13
0.00
0.03

8.92
0.73
-2.49
-2.86
5.73
4.37
4.61
-3.39
-4.31
-0.30
1.73

6.90
-0.72
0.05
0.05
-0.02
-0.01
10.53
-2.79
14.75
10.79
-3.96

0.13
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.31
0.08
0.70
1.46
2.08

7.22
-0.61
0.03
0.03
-0.01
-0.01
12.78
-2.98
12.04
14.22
2.17

0.14
0.09
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.45
0.17
0.14
4.09
4.08

-0.32
-0.12
0.02
0.02
-0.02
-0.01
-2.25
0.18
2.70
-3.42
-6.13

-6.92
-2.87
3.45
3.84
-1.77
-4.46
-4.43
1.96
3.92
-1.21
-2.77

*significant at 0.05 level, **significant at the 0.01 level
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Dictatorship firms

Difference
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
*

Significance levels
Results are based on correlations and mean differences estimated by year. The t-statistics are based on the standard errors of these annual parameter estimates,
and are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure with one lag.

Variable definitions
G-index = number of restrictions on shareholder rights (full sample, 9,917 observations).
Total assets = book value of total assets: data6.
Market value of equity = outstanding shares at the end of the fiscal year multiplied by the share price at the end of the fiscal year: data199 x data25.
Book-to-market equity = book value of equity plus book value of deferred taxes divided by market value of equity: (data60 + data74)/(data199*data25).
Industry-adjusted ROA (after depreciation.) = operating income after depreciation divided by total assets: data178/data6.
Industry-adjusted ROA (before depreciation) = operating income before depreciation divided by total assets: data13/data6.
The two operating performance measures above are industry adjusted by deducting the median performance of the corresponding Fama-French industry.
Forecast error/price = forecast error based on I/B/E/S actual scaled by price: (I/B/E/S actual EPS – I/B/E/S forecast of EPS)/(share price at beginning of fiscal year).
Forecast error/assets = forecast error based on I/B/E/S actual scaled by year-end total assets per share: (I/B/E/S actual EPS – I/B/E/S forecast of EPS)* # shares/data6.
Number of forecasts in consensus = number of analysts having a forecast of earnings per share outstanding eight months before fiscal year-end.
Dispersion in analysts' forecast = standard deviation of analysts' forecasts outstanding eight months before fiscal year-end divided by the mean consensus forecast.
Forecast error in long-term growth forecast = I/B/E/S actual annualized growth in earnings per share minus I/B/E/S forecast of long-term growth in earnings per share,
expressed in percentage terms.
I/B/E/S data items used:
Forecast: mean consensus earnings per share forecast that is eight months before fiscal year-end (e.g., mid-April for firms with December fiscal year-end).
Actual: actual earnings per share as reported by I/B/E/S.
Median long-term growth forecast = median consensus forecast of long-term growth in earnings per share, expressed as the percentage growth per year.
Actual annualized five-year EPS growth rate = realized long-term growth in earnings per share, expressed as the percentage growth per year.
Compustat data items used:
data6 = total assets.
data13 = operating earnings before depreciation.
data25 = number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year.
data60 = book value of common equity.
data74 = deferred taxes.
data178 = operating income after depreciation.
data199= share price at the end of the fiscal year.

41

Table II: Monthly Abnormal Returns from September 1990 to December 1999
This table presents the returns realized by a trading strategy based on G-index. Following Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003), we estimate four-factor regressions using monthly hedge portfolio returns. The hedge portfolio is
constructed by taking a long position in a value-weighted portfolio of Democracy firms (G≤5) and taking a short
position in a value-weighted portfolio of Dictatorship firms (G≥14). The intercept measures the abnormal returns to
such a strategy after controlling for the four factors. The first regression represents the original results in GIM. The
second regression is our replication using the same restrictions as in GIM. The last regression represents the results
when we restrict our sample to the firm-years for which we have Compustat and I/B/E/S data available. For each
firm-year with all data available (9,917 firm-years), we include monthly returns starting the first month of the fiscal
year and ending six months after the end of the fiscal year.

Original results by GIM, Table VI
Intercept
Coefficient
0.71**
Standard error
0.26
t-statistic
2.73

RMRF
-0.04
0.07
-0.57

SMB
-0.22*
0.09
-2.44

HML
-0.55**
0.10
-5.50

Momentum
-0.01
0.07
-0.14

Our replication of GIM result for full sample
Intercept
RMRF
Coefficient
0.69**
-0.04
Standard error
0.26
0.07
t-statistic
2.72
-0.59

SMB
-0.22*
0.09
-2.47

HML
-0.54**
0.10
-5.35

Momentum
-0.01
0.07
-0.09

Restricted sample for which Compustat and I/B/E/S data are available
Intercept
RMRF
SMB
HML
Coefficient
0.68*
-0.01
-0.20*
-0.52**
Standard error
0.28
0.08
0.10
0.11
t-statistic
2.39
-0.06
-2.03
-4.59

Momentum
0.01
0.07
0.07

*significant at 0.05 level, **significant at the 0.01 level
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Table III: Operating Performance
Panel A presents the coefficients on G-index in regressions of industry-adjusted ROA on (1) G-index alone, (2) G-index and log(book-to-market equity), and
(3) G-index, log(market value of equity), and log(book-to-market equity) (coefficients on control variables are not reported). Panel B presents the coefficients on
the Dict indicator variable in regressions of industry-adjusted ROA on Dict alone, Dict and log(book-to-market equity), and Dict, log(market value of equity) and
log(book-to-market equity). Dict is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the firm is in the decile with the weakest shareholder rights (G-index
greater or equal to 14), and zero if the firm is in the decile with the strongest shareholder rights (G-index less than or equal to five). The sample in Panel B is
restricted to firms in the highest and lowest deciles of G-index. We measure ROA as operating income divided by year-end total assets. We measure operating
income in two ways, after and before depreciation. ROA is industry-adjusted by subtracting the ROA of the median firm in the corresponding Fama-French
(1997) industry. Results are based on median regressions by year. Then the time-series mean of coefficients, and the standard deviation and t-statistics for the
average of the coefficients are calculated. The standard errors and t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure with one lag. All
coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience.
Panel A:

Industry-adjusted ROAit = α + β1G-indexi, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1 (1a)
Subpanel A1:
Operating income after depreciation

Subpanel A2:
Operating income before depreciation

Coefficient on G-index

Coefficient on G-index

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Control variables

(1)
-0.01
0.02
-0.07
-0.08
-0.08
0.02
0.04
0.05
-0.21**
None

(2)
-0.04
-0.05
-0.16**
-0.14**
-0.13*
-0.05
-0.06
-0.10
-0.09
BME

Time-series mean
Time-series std
t-statistic

-0.03
0.03
-1.28

-0.09**
0.02
-5.35

(3)
-0.03
-0.06
-0.16**
-0.16**
-0.15**
-0.05
-0.05
-0.10
-0.10
BME, MVE
-0.10**
0.02
-4.77

Obs
1093
1060
1038
1145
1092
1166
1038
989
1296

9
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(1)
-0.06
0.06
-0.04
-0.12
-0.07
0.02
0.08
0.09
-0.33 **
None

(2)
-0.03
-0.05
-0.12*
-0.12*
-0.10
-0.03
-0.01
-0.06
-0.19*
BME

-0.04
0.04
-1.01

-0.08**
0.02
-3.78

(3)
-0.02
-0.04
-0.12*
-0.13*
-0.13
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.10
BME, MVE
-0.07**
0.02
-3.67

Obs
1054
1015
997
1128
1076
1153
1028
974
1279

9

Panel B (Restricted Sample): Industry-adjusted ROAit = α + β1Dicti, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1

(1b)

Subpanel B1:
Operating income after depreciation

Subpanel B2:
Operating income before depreciation

Coefficient on Dict

Coefficient on Dict

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Control variables

(1)
-0.25
-0.43
-1.03
-2.16*
-1.64*
-0.34
-0.02
0.72
-1.53
None

(2)
-0.70
0.00
-1.19*
-1.32*
-1.00
-0.32
0.61
0.17
0.03
BME

Time-series mean
Time-series std
t-statistic

-0.74*
0.34
-2.20

-0.41
0.27
-1.52

(3)
-0.52
-0.49
-1.09
-1.26*
-1.02
-0.34
0.29
-0.10
-0.13
BME, MVE
-0.52**
0.22
-2.35

Obs
180
173
169
192
182
179
159
155
227

(1)
-1.02
0.00
-0.84
-1.70
-0.67
-0.21
-0.07
1.09
-1.16
None

(2)
-1.06
-0.19
-0.67
-1.40
-0.45
0.26
0.30
0.88
-0.78
BME

(3)
-0.39
0.48
-0.86
-1.39
-0.58
0.03
0.32
-0.25
-0.25
BME, MVE

Obs
169
158
155
187
179
176
157
153
225

9

-0.51
0.27
-1.89

-0.35
0.27
-1.30

-0.32
0.21
-1.51

9

*significant at 0.05 level, **significant at the 0.01 level
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Table IV: Differences in One-year Analysts’ Forecast Errors
Panel A presents the coefficient on G-index in the regression of one-year analysts’ forecast errors on G-index, log(market value of equity), and log(book-tomarket equity) (coefficients on control variables are not reported). Forecast errors are defined as I/B/E/S actual earnings per share minus I/B/E/S forecasted
earnings per share, and are deflated either by price or assets per share. Panel B presents the coefficient on the Dict indicator variable in the regression of one-year
analysts’ forecast errors on Dict, log(market value of equity), and log(book-to-market equity). Dict is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the
firm is in the decile with the weakest shareholder rights (G-index greater or equal to 14), and zero if the firm is in the decile with the strongest shareholder rights
(G-index less than or equal to five). The sample in Panel B is restricted to firms in the highest and lowest deciles of G-index. Results are based on median
regressions by year. Then the time-series mean of coefficients, and the standard deviation and t-statistics for the average of the coefficients are calculated. The
standard errors and t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure with one lag. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for
expositional convenience. The regressions for each of the panels are as follows:
Panel A: Analysts’ forecast errorit = α + β1G-indexi, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1
Panel B: Analysts’ forecast errorit = α + β1Dicti, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1
Panel A: Full sample
Dependent variable

FE scaled
by price

Panel B: Restricted sample

FE scaled
by assets

FE scaled
by price

(1)
-0.025
0.002
0.007
-0.004
0.000
0.020**
0.004
0.001
0.007

(2)
-0.008
-0.002
0.010
0.000
0.005
0.011**
0.002
-0.006
0.008

Time-series mean
0.001
0.002
Time-series std
0.004
0.002
t-statistic
0.37
1.00
*significant at 0.05 level, **significant at the 0.01 level

FE scaled
by assets

Coefficient on Dict

Coefficient on G-index
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

(2a)
(2b)

Obs
1093
1060
1038
1145
1092
1166
1038
989
1296

(1)
-0.31
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.24
0.37*
0.12
0.06
0.16

(2)
-0.18
0.02
0.20
-0.01
0.04
0.18
0.11
0.10
0.11

Obs
180
173
169
192
182
179
159
155
227

9

0.07
0.07
1.04

0.06
0.04
1.67

9
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Table V: Differences in Analysts’ Long-Term Growth Forecast Errors
Panel A presents the coefficient on G-index in the regression of analysts’ long-term growth forecast errors on G-index, log(market value of equity), and log(bookto-market equity) (coefficients on control variables are not reported). Analysts’ long-term growth forecast error is defined as realized long-term percentage
growth in earnings (annualized five-year EPS growth rate) minus forecasted long-term percentage growth in earnings, both are provided by I/B/E/S. Panel B
presents the coefficient on the Dict indicator variable in the regression of analysts’ long-term growth forecast errors on Dict, log(market value of equity), and
log(book-to-market equity). Dict is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the firm is in the decile with the weakest shareholder rights (G-index
greater or equal to 14), and zero if the firm is in the decile with the strongest shareholder rights (G-index less than or equal to five). The sample in Panel B is
restricted to firms in the highest and lowest deciles of G-index. Results are based on median regressions by year. Then the time-series mean of coefficients, and
the standard deviation and t-statistics for the average of the coefficients are calculated. The standard errors and t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using
the Newey-West procedure with one lag. The years 1997 and 1998 are combined due to the low number of observations with realized growth available for 1998.
The regressions for each of the panels are as follows:
Panel A: Analysts’ forecast errorit = α + β1G-indexi, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1 (2a)
Panel B: Analysts’ forecast errorit = α + β1Dicti, t-1 + β2logMVEi, t-1 + β3logBMEi, t-1
Panel A: Full sample
Dependent variable

(2b)

Panel B: Restricted sample

Long-term growth forecast error

Long-term growth forecast error

Coefficient on G-index

Obs

Coefficient on Dict

Obs

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997/1998

0.00
-0.17
0.01
0.20
0.48*
0.26
-0.40

852
835
761
799
727
718
745

1.02
0.92
-0.42
0.46
3.01
4.83
-2.89

129
129
113
133
120
107
118

Time-series mean
Time-series std
t-statistic

0.05
0.12
0.45

7

0.99
0.83
1.20

7

*significant at 0.05 level, **significant at the 0.01 level
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Table VI: Returns Around Earnings Announcements
This table shows the returns around earnings announcements during the period from September 1990
through December 1999. Panel A shows the return for each G-index portfolio for the three-day window
around the earnings announcement. All announcement returns are value-weighted within quarter and then
averaged over the quarters. The t-statistics are based on the time series of quarterly returns. Column 1
shows the cumulative raw return over the three-day window and Column 2 shows the accompanying tstatistic. Column 3 shows the cumulative excess return (based on a Fama-French three-factor model for
daily returns estimated from day t=-250 till day t=-21) for the same period, and Column 4 shows the
accompanying t-statistic. Panel B shows a test on the difference between the Democracy portfolio (G-index
≤ 5) and the Dictatorship portfolio (G-index ≥ 14) for both raw returns and excess returns over various
event windows. Returns are calculated as in Panel A.
Panel A: Returns for decile portfolios of the full sample over a (-1,1) window

G-index
≤ 5 (Democracy)
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
≥ 14 (Dictatorship)

Raw return
1.05%
0.56%
0.53%
0.50%
0.44%
0.58%
0.58%
0.33%
0.55%
0.77%

t-statistic
6.87**
2.70**
2.85**
2.38*
3.26**
3.60**
2.67**
2.10*
2.56*
3.22**

Excess return
0.57%
0.20%
0.11%
0.27%
0.11%
0.26%
0.17%
0.02%
0.21%
0.36%

t-statistic
3.70**
1.33
0.68
1.83
1.38
2.18*
1.01
0.15
1.70
1.95

Number of
observations
4333
3604
4377
5007
5499
5683
5387
4065
3262
2775

Panel B: Returns for the restricted sample over various event windows

window
car -1,1
car -3,1
car -5,1
car -10,1
car -20,1

Demo
1.05%
1.36%
1.48%
1.67%
2.32%

Raw returns
Dict
difference
0.77%
0.27%
1.11%
0.25%
1.17%
0.31%
1.37%
0.30%
1.64%
0.68%

t-statistic
1.08
0.87
0.94
0.68
1.32

*significant at 0.05 level, **significant at the 0.01 level
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Demo
0.57%
0.66%
0.55%
0.29%
-0.10%

Excess returns
Dict
difference
0.36%
0.21%
0.38%
0.28%
0.33%
0.22%
0.12%
0.17%
-0.18%
0.08%

t-statistic
0.83
0.91
0.6
0.42
0.18

Table VII: Completed Takeovers of Dictatorships and Democracies
This table presents the number and percentage of firms that were the target of a takeover/merger for both
the Democracy portfolio (G-index ≤ 5) and the Dictatorship portfolio (G-index ≥ 14). The classification is
based on CRSP delisting codes. The deals are presented in three categories: stock deals (CRSP delisting
code 231), cash deals (CRSP delisting code 233), and other (CRSP delisting codes 200-299, excluding 231
and 233). Panel A shows the number of firms taken over by period for each portfolio. Each period begins
with the new IRRC edition. Panel B shows the takeover activity as a percentage of the number of firms in
the portfolio (annualized to ensure comparability across IRRC editions).
Panel A: Firms taken over by period

Period
9/90-6/93
7/93-6/95
7/95-1/98
2/98-12/99
Total

# firms
85
93
87
83
-

Dictatorship
stock cash other
1
1
1
5
1
1
4
7
0
7
3
2
17
12
4

total
3
7
11
12
33

# firms
158
139
120
215
-

Democracy
stock
cash
other
9
3
1
4
4
1
8
6
0
18
11
4
39
24
6

total
1.2%
2.7%
4.5%
5.1%
4.1%

# firms
158
139
120
215
-

Democracy
stock
cash
2.0% 0.7%
1.0% 1.0%
2.4% 1.8%
3.0% 1.8%
2.5% 1.6%

total
13
9
14
33
69

total
2.9%
2.3%
4.1%
5.4%
4.5%

Panel B: Annualized probability of takeover

Period
9/90-6/93
7/93-6/95
7/95-1/98
2/98-12/99
Annualized average

# firms
85
93
87
83
-

Dictatorship
stock cash other
0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
1.9% 0.4% 0.4%
1.6% 2.8% 0.0%
3.0% 1.3% 0.9%
2.1% 1.5% 0.5%
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other
0.2%
0.3%
0.0%
0.7%
0.3%

Table VIII: Performance Attribution Regressions
This table presents the returns realized by a trading strategy based on G-index. Panel A shows the
development of the returns on the hedge portfolio based on total returns. The first part shows the
cumulative growth of the hedge portfolio and the second part shows the annualized stock returns in each of
the two subperiods and over the total period. Panel B shows the abnormal returns. Following Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we estimate four-factor regressions using monthly hedge portfolio returns. The
hedge portfolio is constructed by taking a long position in a value-weighted portfolio of Democracy firms
(G≤5) and taking a short position in a value-weighted portfolio of Dictatorship firms (G≥14). The intercept
measures the abnormal returns to such a strategy after controlling for the four factors.
Panel A: Total returns on the hedge portfolio
Cumulative results in dollars
Value of $1 invested in the Democracy portfolio:
Value of $1 invested in the Dictatorship portfolio:
Value of hedge portfolio:
Annualized stock returns
Democracy portfolio
Dictatorship portfolio
Difference

9/1/1990
1
1
0

12/31/1999
7.04
3.42
3.62

12/31/2003
5.54
4.05
1.49

1990-1999
23.3%
14.1%
9.2%

2000-2003
-5.8%
4.3%
-10.1%

1990-2003
13.7%
11.1%
2.6%

Panel B: Monthly abnormal returns
Our replication of GIM results over the original sample period (Sept. 1990 - Dec. 1999)
Intercept
RMRF
SMB
HML
Coefficient
0.69**
-0.04
-0.22*
-0.54**
Standard error
0.26
0.07
0.09
0.10
t-statistic
2.72
-0.59
-2.47
-5.34

Momentum
-0.01
0.07
-0.09

Analysis of period following the original sample period (Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2003)
Intercept
RMRF
SMB
HML
Coefficient
-0.13
0.28*
0.07
-0.41**
Standard error
0.55
0.12
0.11
0.14
t-statistic
-0.24
2.39
0.58
-2.89

Momentum
0.03
0.05
0.63

Analysis of the combined sample period
Intercept
Coefficient
0.40
Standard error
0.24
t-statistic
1.68

Momentum
-0.01
0.03
-0.25

(Sept. 1990 - Dec. 2003)
RMRF
SMB
0.09
-0.08
0.06
0.06
1.34
-1.18

*significant at 0.05 level, **significant at the 0.01 level
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HML
-0.53**
0.08
-6.65

Figure 1: Cumulative raw returns: Democracies and Dictatorships from 1990-2003
This figure shows the development of the value of the Democracy, Dictatorship and hedge portfolios from
1990 to 2003. The upper line plots value of the Democracy portfolio over time, assuming $1 is invested in
the portfolio in September, 1990. The middle line plots the value of the Dictatorship portfolio. And the
bottom line plots the value of the hedge portfolio.
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